A New Approach to Arab-African Cooperation – The Arab Wall
A New Approach to Arab-African Cooperation

A New Approach to Arab-African Cooperation



The Arab Center for Research and Advanced Studies organized on the 22nd of November 2022 a Discussion panel titled “The Security Factor in Arab- African Relations”. The center played host to Dr Hamdy Abdelrahman, Professor of Political Science in Zayed University, the UAE, who was its keynote speaker. Professor Abdelrahman placed Arab African Relations in the perspective of two key schools of thought that will impact any future Arab African dialogue, which are: 

-The “extremist vision”, centered on ethnicity, common in Western studies, that looks on Africa as an “unknown” continent, with a peripheral status in the international system, and therefore Arab-African relations are an issue of marginal importance. The African side which espouses this vision considers the Arabs as invaders who took control of North Africa. Therefore, African studies in this context advocate for a strong focus on African civilization.

-The “shared heritage” perspective, an alternative view has been proposed by African scholars, such as Kenyan thinker Ali Mazrui. They rejected the previous perspective and focused on the historical heritage of African- Arab interaction, which preceded Islam. The Arab influence is present throughout the continent, such as the heritage documented   in Arab scripture. It is estimated that about 60% of the Swahili language is based on Arabic. The common African Arab heritage also extends to the era of fighting colonialism, when both Arab and African leaders moved to establish entities such as the African Union and the Arab League. During this era, security issues and disagreements regarding borders were viewed as common challenges. This heritage can serve as a foundation for a strategic Arab African dialogue. 

Principal Challenges

Professor Abdel Rahman outlined several challenges to the strengthening of Arab-African relations on t the security level: 

The vagaries of institutionalization: Despite Arab African closeness during the 1950’s the 60’s however saw a decline in relations.1977 proved a pivotal moment  in the institutionalization of relations with the holding of the first Arab- African summit in Cairo, which established the routine of holding summits. However, only 4 Arab-African summits were held since then. Between 1977 and 2010, the summit was impeded by differences generated by Egypt’s signing of a peace deal with Israel, as well as differing opinions over developments in Chad and southern Sudan. Libya hosted an Arab- African summit in 2010, bearing in the context  of Muamar Ghaddafi’s, then leader of Libya, aspirations to play a leading role in Africa. Kuwait hosted the summit in 2013, which laid the foundations for establishing a joint committee for the exchanges of information on certain issues, such as illegal migration. It was also agreed that the summit would be held periodically every 3 years. The fourth summit was held in 2016 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with weak attendance, as only 17 heads of state attended, while 8 heads of state boycotted the event. The summit has not been held since then. 

The effects of the Arab Spring on security in Africa: The collapse of some Arab states led to the unprecedented growth in the activity of terrorist organizations, which severely destabilized security on the African continent, as these groups took advantage of the insecure borders. For example, the collapse of the central government of Libya allowed the Tuareg tribes, who had been recruited in Ghaddafi’s army, to head towards the north of Mali laden with weaponry . They thereafter joined forces with the Azod freedom movement there. Africa therefore became  a safe haven for terrorist groups after the fall of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, with these groups  moving between countries through established  “corridors”, such as the one between Libya, Algeria and Niger. 

The presence of foreign powers: There are now several foreign powers competing over resources and influence in Africa. France is strongly active in the Sahel region and is an influential player there. Russia’s influence is also felt through the presence of the Wagner group. China also has interests in Africa, though its military presence is confined to a military base in Djibouti, to protect its interests and evacuate Chinese nationals when necessary.  The presence of multiple military bases in Djibouti has resulted in the “militarization’ of the Red Sea, as the foreign fleets with a presence there have strictly utilitarian and material interests, and play no  role in addressing  the security challenges and multiple crises from which Africa suffers.

The rising role of non-Arab middle powers: Non-Arab middle powers have begun to infiltrate Africa to further their own agendas. Turkey for example has brought the conflict in the east Mediterranean to Libya, and the competition in the Horn of Africa to the Sahara region. Turkey established its largest overseas military base in Somalia and had hopes of establishing one in Sudan during the reign of Omar Bashir. Iran has also been playing a role in Africa that is less skillful but more dangerous through its networks, such as the Quds Brigades, and other tools. Iran puts forth the view that Islam in its origins is Shii, and relies on minorities of Iranian descent in the east of Africa to be the conduit to expanding Iranian influence. Iran has also supplied arms to some separatist movements, such as the Polisario in the western Sahara, and another movement in Senegal. 

The lack of a unified Arab stance towards Africa: There are clashing Arab views on how to cooperate with Africa, particularly as Arab countries prefer to conduct interest-based  bilateral relations. Therefore, there has been no progress towards developing a common Arab perspective on how to cooperate with Africa within the wider perspective of human security. Moreover, Arab countries tend to allow their own differences to overshadow their stances towards African issues. Stances towards the Poisario and the issue of the Western Sahara reflect this situation. For although the African Union has recognized the Western Sahara, Morocco does not, and its relations with any Arab country that recognizes this independence becomes tense, as happened lately with Tunisia. 

The crisis of governance and the nation-state in Africa: African countries are facing a governance challenges, such as widespread corruption, conflicting loyalties, weak armies, which directly impact their ability to establish security. Government control in some countries does not extend beyond the capital. There are also issues related to regime change through military coups, such as recently occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Some questions have been raised regarding the seriousness of some governments in combatting terrorism, and undermining militant groups, as funds dedicated to strengthening security forces in order to combat terrorism have been seized and directed towards different ends.

 Alternative African perspectives on security: As Arab countries such as Egypt has been preoccupied with domestic challenges since 2011, and others such as Libya have witnessed regime collapse, the role of some African countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, has expanded. From the Arab perspective, there appears to be a rising coalition between South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia, to develop a security vision which ignores traditional issues in favor of endorsing human security, and sidelines Arab concerns.

The impact of climate change on human security:  The adverse effects of climate change has led to the eruption of several crises on the African continent, such as the issues regarding the impact of Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam, and the drought that has struck Somalia. This can be considered the most important threat to human security in its broadest sense on the continent, and should merit a higher degree of Arab-African cooperation. 

The need for a new approach

Professor Abdel Rahman outlined three Arab approaches to conflict resolution in Africa, one which assumes a confrontational stance towards some issues as the result of Arab divisions, such as the Arab stance towards the Western Sahara. The second approach displayed Arab-African consensus, such as consensus on opposing Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia in 2006, while the third reflected Arab ineffectiveness on certain issues, such as the independence of Southern Sudan.

He therefore argues the need for a different Arab approach, one that relies on soft power and  providing  basic services and economic projects in Africa. This could help counter the two prevailing trends, the security perspective espoused by the west, especially the US, which advances its own security interests, and the attempts to impose a specific vision of human rights, and the Chinese perspective of exploiting resources that can lead African countries to fall into the debt trap.

In order to strengthen Arab-African relations at a time of numerous challenges, including proxy wars and rising foreign influence, Professor Abdel Rahman proposes the adoption of a new approach that transcends the old traditional issues related to colonialism, which no longer resonate in Africa, and rather focuses on development and services which are the central priorities to most African countries.