The Risk of Civil War in Afghanistan – The Arab Wall
The Risk of Civil War in Afghanistan

The Risk of Civil War in Afghanistan



The current situation in Afghanistan suggests that matters could deteriorate further, into an all-out civil war, echoing that of the 1990’s. The Taliban have failed to integrate the various ethnic groups that make up Afghan society into their new regime. Several “fronts”, comprising former Afghan officials and elements of the alienated ethnic groups, are now organizing to take up the fight against the Taliban, with some external support. This article will strive to outline various developments on the ground that appear to be escalating tensions to the point of a potential civil war.

Racial and Ethnic Discrimination 

 The Taliban have failed to create a representative government. Although their new government was announced in September 2021, the Taliban are yet to reach out to the various other ethnicities and communities in Afghanistan and include them in government. This is causing widespread domestic discontent. The government is comprised only of Taliban members (who belong to the Pashtuns), and does not include Tajiks, Hazaras, or Uzbeks, nor even any women. There is therefore considerable resentment from these various groups against the Taliban, and their exclusion has united them all in opposition to the Taliban government. 

These communities view the Taliban regime as an expression of  racial and ethnic discrimination, especially in the context of repeated reports of physical assault, or the confiscation of property belonging to Hazaras, for example. The situation in Afghanistan is therefore likely to implode at any time, owing to ethnic exclusion and mounting ethnic tensions.

Regional Tensions

 Discontent resulting from the exclusion of non-Pashtun ethnicities from governance is not limited to domestic politics, but has also been expressed by neighbouring countries, as well as the international community at large. There is growing external pressures on the Taliban to create a representative coalition government, which includes at least the three dominant ethnicities in the country: the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. At the forefront of those pressing for this inclusion are Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, who are speaking on behalf of 55 percent of Afghanistan’s population who come from the same ethnic background as these neighbouring states.

In Iran, figures from the government,  the military, and even the Revolutionary Guard, such as Quds Force Unit Commander Ismail Qa ‘ani, have all called for the formation of an inclusive national government in Afghanistan. At the same time, Dushanbe and Tashkent also call for the inclusion of all ethnicities in Kabul’s government, and consistently denounce the Taliban political system of rule.

Neighbouring countries are moreover growingly concerned about the very survival of these ethnicities that are subjected to discrimination in Afghanistan. There have, for example, been reports in Iranian media that there is a “driven” exodus of Shiite Hazaras from Afghanistan as a result of attacks against them and confiscation of their property. This is causing serious concern in Tehran, given the ethnic and religious links Iran has with the Hazaras, as well as using them as a means of exerting Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Iran has become outspoken in expressing these concerns, and there have been some calls there for Tehran to intervene to protect them.

There are similar concerns in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and their media circulate corresponding reports of racial discrimination in Afghanistan. In the context of this pressure  for the protection of ethnicities, Tajikistan, for example, has welcomed several leaders of the anti-Taliban front. Other regional countries have expressed support for the Supreme Council of National Resistance against the Taliban.

The rise of terrorist activity in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s ascent to power is also raising concerns in the region. ISIS has seized the opportunity to  extend the scope and number of its operations, thereby increasing the threat  to Afghanistan’s neighbours and Central Asia as a whole.

Neighbouring countries have also publicly voiced their concerns regarding this issue. Iran, for example, has made those concerns explicit through official statements, such as those made by the Assistant Head of the Iranian Mission to the United Nations, Zahra Irshadi, in April 2022, regarding Iran’s concerns about the escalation of ISIS activity in Afghanistan.Russia, which is geographically close to Central Asia, also expressed these concerns in the statement made by its First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyansky, in December 2021, and again by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in March 2022.

The specific concerns of these states are compounded by the fact that the terrorist threat to Central Asia is not limited to ISIS alone. Other terrorist groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Al Qaeda continue to pose a threat to those states. Pakistan has recently begun to suffer from an escalation in terrorist activity in Afghanistan, particularly from threats posed by Tehrik-e-Taliban, the Taliban-like group of Afghanistan. Islamabad recently recognized this threat after an increase in terrorist operations against its army soldiers, especially on the border with Afghanistan, prompting its military to strike in April 2022. Like its Afghan counterpart, Tehrik-e-Taliban seeks to rule Pakistan.

All of this may lead surrounding states to oppose the Taliban rule in Afghanistan seeing as it has demonstrated its inability to control the security situation, ot to crackdown on terrorist organizations.

The Challenge from the Northern Alliance

 The biggest to Taliban rule comes from the son of the former Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Masoud, who has announced that he will oppose and resist the Taliban until an inclusive coalition government is formed, incorporating all ethnicities and communities , including Tajiks, who account for about 37% of the total Afghan population.

Masoud, who is of Tajik origin, enjoys widespread support both in Afghanistan, and across Central Asia. Masoud’s power is concentrated in the province of Panjshir (known as Valley of the Five Lions) in north-eastern Afghanistan and has strong support from countries such as Iran and Tajikistan in particular. Masoud is currently seeking to regain strength and regroup the Panjshir Front in order to resume fighting against the Taliban, having been forced to leave the country during its takeover last year. Masoud repeatedly states, most recently in interviews with French media in May 2022, that he is fighting for freedom and democracy in Afghanistan, stressing that his front is seeking to grow its numbers, incorporating many from the former Afghan army as well as volunteers. 

Masoud also stressed that if the Taliban did not form an inclusive coalition government, there would be no choice but to resist. These statements, as well as those by Masoud’s supporters, have prompted the Taliban to send military patrols to Panjshir in recent weeks in an attempt to quell any movement by Masoud loyalists and the Supreme Council for National Resistance. 

War Lords

 Resistance to the Taliban inside Afghanistan is not limited to the Masoud front. Former Afghan warlords and politicians in exile have announced the establishment of a Supreme Council for National Resistance late last April to pressure the Taliban to form an inclusive government, warning that civil war would “inevitably” be the alternative. These individuals emphasized that the Council’s mission would be to “liberate” Afghanistan.

Leading the Council is a prominent Afghan of Uzbek origin, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is currently residing in Turkiye, and formerly served as Afghanistan’s Vice-President in its previous government. In late April, Dostum brought together 40 former Afghan politicians in the Turkish capital to discuss the ongoing transformations within their country.

International Recognition 

 Sanctions imposed on Afghanistan by the international community, and international refusal to recognise the Taliban government, have impeded its access to funds and restricted external trade. This has exacerbated the dire  living conditions from which the Afghan people suffer. Recent UN reports indicate Afghanistan’s poverty rate has exceeded 80 percent in recent months, while relief organizations estimate that 24 million Afghans face severe hunger, and up to 9 million more are on the brink of famine. These difficult conditions may prompt more Afghans to join anti-Taliban movements.

Avoiding War 

In conclusion, while the various factors mentioned above could lead to a potential civil war in Afghanistan, at least on the long-term , Kabul could still avoid conflict by appeasing the excluded ethnicities and  forming an inclusive  government, incorporating various groups and women. Acceding to this and other demands may also lead the international community to recognize such an inclusive government, thereby easing conditions somewhat on the domestic level.