The recent military field operations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen reflect a change in the rules of engagement with militias and factions loyal to Iran. After Iraq officially announced the end of the international coalition forces’ combat missions against ISIS on December 9th,2021, two attacks were thwarted, one on the Ain al-Assad base in Anbar, and the second in the diplomatic area in Baghdad on January 3rd. On January 5th,2022, the international coalition launched an attack on militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards in eastern Deir ez-Zor in Syria, while the Arab Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen continued to thwart attacks launched by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia. This raises many questions about how the rules of engagement have changed, and the possible repercussions of this change.
Characteristics of Change
Most of the parties under attack from Iranian proxies and the Revolutionary Guards have adopted a policy of strategic patience in the past period. In most cases, the reactions against these militias were contained to launching limited defensive strikes or issuing statements regarding the need to pursue the factions and militias loyal to Iran, in addition to improving capabilities of defense systems to intercept missiles and drones. Iran took advantage of this situation, expanding offensive operations, and its field presence. Moreover, Iran also did not respond positively to attempts to reach settlements, either at the bilateral level, regarding the Arab coalition’s proposed initiative to settle the Yemeni crisis, or regarding the nuclear negotiations in Vienna, where Western and regional powers demanded that Iran cease its regional military expansion.
This new stance towards Iran’s proxies is likely to have consequences on the regional stage, including a reversal of the relative decrease in military confrontations witnessed over the past period. There is likely to be an escalation in military action in the coming period, to thwart Iran’s use of proxies to apply pressure on the United States and its regional allies. It is also possible forces may come together to pressure Iran militarily and push back its regional expansion, rather than simply countering its offensive operations on military and civilian sites. This collective coordination will most likely constitute a strategic alternative to the formation of a declared alliance to confront Iran militarily.
Deterrence Mechanisms
Given the developments on the ground, it appears that there is emerging a different approach to deterrence, which will rely on a number of mechanisms, including:
Enhancing defensive and offensive capabilities: Iraqi forces were able to thwart drone attacks by using US C-RAM systems. This success represents a qualitative step forward in dealing with such operations in the future. The militias that conducted these attacks claim that the government’s announcement of the US withdrawal from Iraq is not credible, and that they are attacking American, not Iraqi, bases. In fact, the latest attacks by the militias are a test of Iraqi forces, which seem to have regained control and are no longer satisfied with merely issuing statements pledging to pursue armed groups and hand them over to the judiciary.
Preemptive strikes: The operations of the Arab Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen have adopted a stance of preemptive deterrence, through precise counterattacks based on successful monitoring and reconnaissance of the coordinates of the points from which enemy attacks are launched. In addition, the capabilities of the Joint Forces and other resistance forces in the field have been enhanced through a redeployment of the Giants Brigades from the western coast to Shabwa. This has proven successful in impeding the Houthis’ progress towards Ma’rib, as well as restoring vital sites such as Usaylan, and eliminating the Houthis from Baihan.
Targeting militia weaponry: In Syria, field reports revealed that there have been precise attacks targeting missile launchers in eastern Deir Ez-Zor using drones, which is the first time that such operations have been carried out. In addition, there have been warnings from the US of possible wider military attacks against the militias if they continue to target US forces.
Introducing laser weapons: On December 14th,2021, the US Navy conducted a test of a new laser weapon, successfully destroying a floating training target in the Gulf of Aden. The threat of using this weapon, in addition to the choice of the Gulf of Aden to conduct the test, suggests that this move is a part of the ongoing escalation between Iran and the United State. It is noteworthy that the test was conducted about three weeks before the second anniversary of the assasination of Qassem Soleimani, on January 3rd.
Motivations of new approach
It is possible the US administration has determined that negotiations and pressure on Iran are futile, especially given Washington has failed to contain even Iran’s proxies. US diplomacy in Yemen did not succeed, even after removing the Houthis movement from the blacklist and appointing an American envoy. In Iraq, it appears that Iran’s proxies are seeking to take advantage of the end of the US and the International Coalition’s combat missions by depleting and weakening Iraqi security forces. Additionally, Iran has not responded to demands for it to abandon its expansionist policy.
Other motives may have also contributed to changing the US position. These include the role of Iran and its proxies in supporting terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In Yemen, reports revealed a tripartite process of exchange between Al Qaeda, the Houthis, and Iran, in which the militia began releasing dozens of members of Al Qaeda in Yemen. While Washington has been working for years to undermine Al Qaeda’s presence there, an operation of this scale will allow the organization to once more regain its footing. Meanwhile, in Syria, there are numerous reports that Iran is seeking to revive ISIS’ role in the country’s eastern region, with the aim of using it to target US and Kurdish forces.
Possible Scenario
Perhaps the first step in confronting Iran is to paralyze its external arms or regional proxies. There are challenges to considering a direct confrontation with Iran while the Revolutionary Guards operate proxies in many arenas through which they can confuse or weaken any attempt to undermine Iran. If the new approach is successful in curtailing these proxies, it may represent a motive for Iran to revise its regional policy. It is of note that Israeli assessments also indicate it is moving in the same direction with the United States to target the Iranian presence in Syria.
On the other hand, Tehran may play the diplomatic card again, but it is unlikely to make comprehensive concessions on all regional files. It will most likely begin making concessions on Yemen, which it is likely to lose anyway. Syria remains in Russia’s hands, while tensions are likely to prevail in Iraq until the formation of the government.
It can be said, for the first time, that there are indications of the formation of a collective deterrence effort against Iran’s proxies in the region. This effort is bearing fruit, as the Revolutionary Guards’ militias and proxies are currently suffering heavy losses. Forces are also targeting the militias’ military infrastructure, including missile platforms, drones, and others. However, it is important to monitor how this development in the rules of engagement will translate into a political variable that will push Iran to retreat, even gradually, from its regional expansionism. This will be impacted by the regional balance of power to emerge from these new rules of engagement.